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Third, and perhaps most importantly, a rhetorical tone likeNietzsche's — looked at in the context of his life — doesnot really suggest realism about the content, but rather desperationon the part of the author to reach an increasingly distant anduninterested audience. The Nietzsche who was almost completely ignoredduring the years before illness erased his intellect and deprived himof his sanity might have resorted to more and more strident andviolent rhetoric in frustration over not being heard — and notbecause he was a realist. Indeed, in the absence of explicit evidenceof value realism, this seems the most plausible explanation for thevast majority of the passages with which we have been concerned inthis section.

Every means is proper to do this; every

Nietzsche's works are cited as follows, unless otherwise noted:roman numerals refer to major parts or chapters in Nietzsche's works;Arabic numerals refer to sections, not pages.


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That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end.


The will to a system is a lack of integrity.

Nor did we doubt that all the antecedents of our will, its causes, were to be found in our own consciousness or in our personal "motives." Otherwise, we would not be responsible for what we choose to do.

Because we never fathom their depths.

Humans have always believed that they knew what a cause was; but how did we get this knowledge — or more precisely, our faith that we had this knowledge?

And what excellent teeth it had!

The idea of consciousness ("spirit") or, later, that of the ego (the "subject") as a cause are only afterbirths: first the causality of the will was firmly accepted as proved, as a fact, and these other concepts followed from it.

And today — what is lacking?" A dentist's question.

(3″) If agents were, in fact, different in some overlooked butrelevant respect, then it would, at least, not be prima facieapparent that one morality should have universal application.

Falling into the first one, one always does too much.

And what a nice delusion we had perpetrated with this "empirical evidence;" we interpreted the real world as a world of causes, a world of wills, a world of spirits.

So one usually perpetrates another one — and now one does too little.

It is the burden, then, of Nietzsche's critique of the DescriptiveComponent of MPS to show that, in fact, none of these latter thesesabout the nature of agency hold. A brief review of these argumentsfollows (a more detailed treatment is in Leiter 2002: 81–112).