Bacon's manuscripts already mention the doctrine of the idolsas a necessary condition for constituting scientia operativa.In Cogitata et Visa he compares deductive logic as used by thescholastics to a spider's web, which is drawn out of its ownentrails, whereas the bee is introduced as an image of scientiaoperativa. Like a bee, the empiricist, by means of his inductivemethod, collects the natural matter or products and then works them upinto knowledge in order to produce honey, which is useful for healthynutrition.
Form is for Bacon a structural constituent of a natural entity or akey to its truth and operation, so that it comes near to natural law,without being reducible to causality. This appears all the moreimportant, since Bacon—who seeks out exclusively causes whichare necessary and sufficient for their effects—rejectsAristotle's four causes (his four types of explanation for a completeunderstanding of a phenomenon) on the grounds that the distributioninto material, formal, efficient, and final causes does not work welland that they fail to advance the sciences (especially the final,efficient, and material causes):
Francis Bacon [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
According to Bacon, man would be able to explain all the processesin nature if he could acquire full insight into the hidden structureand the secret workings of matter (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 101).Bacon's conception of structures in nature, functioning accordingto its own working method, concentrates on the question of how naturalorder is produced, namely by the interplay of matter and motion. InDe Principiis atque Originibus, his materialistic stance withregard to his conception of natural law becomes evident. TheSummary Law of Nature is a virtus(matter-cum-motion) or power in accordance with matter theory, or
Francis Bacon (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Historians of science, with their predilection for mathematicalphysics, used to criticize Bacon's approach, stating that“the Baconian concept of science, as an inductive science, hasnothing to do with and even contradicts today's form ofscience” (Malherbe 1996, 75). In reaching this verdict, however,they overlooked the fact that a natural philosophy based on a theory ofmatter cannot be assessed on the grounds of a natural philosophy orscience based on mechanics as the fundamental discipline. One canaccount for this chronic mode of misunderstanding as a specimen of theparadigmatic fallacy (Gaukroger 2001, 134ff.; see Rees 1986).
His aphoristic style makes Bacon an essayist of high distinction.
Bacon's interpretation of nature uses “Tablesand Arrangements of Instances” concerning the natural phenomenaunder investigation, which function as a necessary condition forcracking the code of efficient causation. His prerogativeinstances are not examples or phenomena simply taken from naturebut rather imply information with inductive potential which showpriority conducive to knowledge or to methodological relevance wheninserted into tables. The instances do not represent the order ofsensible things, but instead express the order of qualities (natures).These qualities provide the working basis for the order of abstractnatures. Bacon's tables have a double function: they areimportant for natural history, collecting the data on bodiesand virtues in nature; and they are also indispensable forinduction, which makes use of these data.