Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983) Minds, ..

Thus, Rorty's radical irrealist picture of the mind relies on theobservation that pains and arithmetical beliefs seem to have nothingin common. Not many contemporary philosophers of mind would acceptRorty's irrealist picture of the mind. But most do recognize that ifminds are real, then two problems arise: the problem ofintentionality and the problem of consciousness or consciousphenomenal experience. Most would claim that a solution to theproblem of intentionality is not ipso facto a solution to theproblem of consciousness. Why is that so?

31/05/1983 · Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind [John R

John Searle gives his own ideas about language, intentionality, and thought. He also covers a lot of other Philosophers of Language, such as Whitehead and Wittgenstein.

Intentionality an essay in the philosophy of mind searle nyc

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of ..

Within the orthodox paradigm in the philosophy of mind and languageof the 1960's and 1970's, there was an important swing of the pendulumaway from the implications of Frege's and especially Russell'sdoctrines for intentionality. The so-called “theory of directreference” has contributed to rehabilitate the view thatconcrete individuals matter more to the identity of the singularthoughts that humans entertain than the Frege/Russell doctrinesallow. According to Frege's distinction between sense and reference,what matters to the identity of a thought about a concrete individualis not the individual thought about but the abstract sense by means ofwhich he is thought about. According to Russell, most thoughts thatseem prima facie to be about concrete individuals are in fact notsingular thoughts but generally quantified propositions. Much of theimpetus for the theory of direct reference came from the implicationsof the semantics of modal logic for the intentionality of singularthoughts and beliefs.

An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind

René Descartes, in his epoch-making Meditations on FirstPhilosophy (1641), had argued that minds and bodies are two distinctkinds of being or substance with two distinct kinds of attributes ormodes: bodies are characterized by spatiotemporal physical properties,while minds are characterized by properties of thinking (includingseeing, feeling, etc.). Centuries later, phenomenology would find, withBrentano and Husserl, that mental acts are characterized byconsciousness and intentionality, while natural science would find thatphysical systems are characterized by mass and force, ultimately bygravitational, electromagnetic, and quantum fields. Where do we findconsciousness and intentionality in thequantum-electromagnetic-gravitational field that, by hypothesis, orderseverything in the natural world in which we humans and our minds exist?That is the mind-body problem today. In short, phenomenology by anyother name lies at the heart of the contemporary mind-body problem.

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983); ..

Since the late 1980s, and especially the late 1990s, a variety ofwriters working in philosophy of mind have focused on the fundamentalcharacter of consciousness, ultimately a phenomenological issue. Doesconsciousness always and essentially involve self-consciousness, orconsciousness-of-consciousness, as Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre held(in verying detail)? If so, then every act of consciousness eitherincludes or is adjoined by a consciousness-of-that-consciousness. Doesthat self-consciousness take the form of an internal self-monitoring?If so, is that monitoring of a higher order, where each act ofconsciousness is joined by a further mental act monitoring the baseact? Or is such monitoring of the same order as the base act, a properpart of the act without which the act would not be conscious? A varietyof models of this self-consciousness have been developed, someexplicitly drawing on or adapting views in Brentano, Husserl, andSartre. Two recent collections address these issues: David WoodruffSmith and Amie L. Thomasson (editors), Phenomenology and Philosophy ofMind (2005), and Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (editors),Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (2006).

Intentionality an essay in the philosophy of mind searle

More recently, analytic philosophers of mind have rediscoveredphenomenological issues of mental representation, intentionality,consciousness, sensory experience, intentional content, andcontext-of-thought. Some of these analytic philosophers of mind harkback to William James and Franz Brentano at the origins of modernpsychology, and some look to empirical research in today’s cognitiveneuroscience. Some researchers have begun to combine phenomenologicalissues with issues of neuroscience and behavioral studies andmathematical modeling. Such studies will extend the methods oftraditional phenomenology as the Zeitgeist moves on. Weaddress philosophy of mind below.